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A

zealOUS legalist would argue that Russia, or rather its pred ecessor the Soviet

Union, has repeatedly demonstrated its inclination to use armed force in

the absence of an actual attack against itself. Preceden ts that would likely be cited

include the "Winter War" of 1939-40 against Finland, and the interventions in
Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Some might add the deployment

to Afghanistan in 1979 oc, in paradoxical contradistinction to those examples. the
Wehrmacht attack against the USSR which was launched in 1941, at least as
claimed by Nazi leaders and some contemporary historians, to forestall an imminen t Red Army assault.
Whatever the merits of those alleged preceden ts, in its declaratory policy and
form al acts, the Soviet Union abided by a rather narrow, or restrictive, interpretation of the principle of non-use offorce. It acceded to the Treaty for the Ren u nciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928 1 and was a party to the Convention
for the Definition of Aggression of 1933. 2 Although the latter might seem a less
classical sou rce, Justice Jackson in his opening address fo r the United States at the
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Nuremberg Military Trib unal described it as "one of the most authoritative
sources of international law on this subject."3
In a conspicuous departure from the Soviet-era official and doctrinally strict,
i.e., narrow, interpretation of the right of self-defense, Russian officials have, since
2002, increasingly been indicating that it might be permissible to use armed force
against extraterritorial sources of imminent threat to Russian security, even in the
absence of an actual armed attack originating from those sources. Those statements, made by politicians, senior military commanders and ultimately by the
president, were enthusiastically endorsed by a handful of Russian legal academics.4
The qualifier that usually accompanies the term "use offorce" is "preventive," and
Russian official statements do not seem to be sensitive to nuances of meaning between that and other adjectives, such as "preemptive," or "anticipatory," or "interceptive. "5 As to the location and nature of the sources of those threats and the
targets of the preventive use offorce, while earlier declarations announced an intention to engage them globally,6 their personality notwithstanding, eventually the
declarations came to express a readiness to deal with sources of terrorist threats in
the space adjacent to the Russian territory.
The earlier remarks that caught international attention had been made in July
and August 2002 by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and other military commanders, and several ranking parliamentarians. These statements, incidentally, were
made soon after President George W. Bush broached preemption in his commencement address at the US Military Academy.7
Those statements were prompted by the events that occurred on the RussianGeorgian border. Russia claimed that Chechen insurgents found refuge in the
Pankissi Gorge in Georgia, an area where Georgian law and order was nonexistent.
The area was convenient for insurgent rest and recreation, and to regroup and reenter Russian territory. Those allegations had been vehemently denied by Georgian authorities, although apparently the US "Train and Equip" mission to
Georgia8 had, as one of its principal objectives, the establishment of viable indigenous law-enforcement units that could regain control over the mountainous and
hard-to-reach Pankissi Gorge area. Russian politicians asserted that even though
Georgian authorities could not be implicated beyond doubt in providing shelter to
insurgents, they definitely lacked the capability and determination to deny access
to and freedom of insurgent activity in the area.
President Putin in his statement on September 11,2002 commemorating the
victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States looked for legal support for the Russian position. He said that "should the Georgian leadership be unable to secure the area adjacent to the border and contin ue to ignore the UN SC
Resolution 1373 of28 September, 2001 ... ,we shall reselVe the right to act in
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accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter that entitles every member-State of
the Un ited Nations to enjoy an in herent right to individual or collective selfdefense. "'I President Putin went further and instructed the uniformed services to
draft engagement plans "to pursue terrorists and destroy their bases that have been
reliably located and identified."lu
That statement by President Putin prompted an angry response from the Council of Europe whose Parliamentary Assembly insisted that "Article 51 of the UN
Charter and Resolution 1269 (1999 ) of the UN Security Council, as well as Resolution 1368 (200 1) of the UN Security Council of 12 September do not authorize the
use of military force by the Russian Federation or any other State on Georgian territory."ll It further called on the Russian authorities to refrain from "launching any
military action on Georgian territory as expressed by the President of the Russian
Federation on 11 September 2002 ."12
Not only was the Parliamentary Assembly's declaration rather unfair to President Putin , it was also inaccurate. The Russian president looked to Security Council Resolution 1373 for authority, and that reference was conspicuously ignored by
the Council of Europe. It should be recalled that Resolution 1373 specifically urged
UN member-States to deny terrorists movement across borders and to ensure that
refugee status is not granted to persons suspected of terrorist activity. 13 Russia was
concerned that Georgia was unable or unwilling to abide by those and other provisions of the resolution. Additionally, President Putin had not ordered that immediate military action be undertaken on the territory of a sovereign State. Rather, he
ordered that contingency plans be made, conditional on Georgia's capacity to effectivdy control its own territory.
Putin's statement may also be interpreted as an implicit extrapolation, whether
conscious or not, of the right of hot pursuit from the realm of the law of the sea 14 to
trans-boundary law-enforcement. His phrase about "pursuit of terrorists" obviously alluded to situations when culprits would be pursued and apprehended, or
accounted for, either on the Russian territory, or, pursuit having commenced on
the Russian territory and continued across the border, on the territory of an adjacent State. IS It is also worth noting that the Russian president construed Article 51
of the UN Charter as entitling a State to the right of self-defense against an armed
attack by actors other than a State.
It is true that Article 51 does not unequivocally refer to a State as a perpetrator of
an attack; however, if one were to accept that "Article 2 (4) explains what is prohibited, Article 51 what is permitted," 16 and Article 2 (4) refers to relations between
members of the United Nations, that is, States, then Article 51 should apply to
States, too. It should be recalled that in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the OCCllpied Palestinian Territory, the
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International Court of lustice uttered a dictum, albeit argumentative, that "Article
51 of the Charter recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the
case of armed attack by one State against another State."17
While suspected terrorist bases in certain neighbor ing countries and prospective targeting of those bases have been a recurring theme in remarks by Russian senior officials since 2002, most often they have not been country-specific. 18
In most instances, the statements describing situations that would justify the
employment of the armed forces beyond Russian territory to p reempt an attack are
related to a terrorist threat. Occasional references to threats to lives and security of
large numbers of Russian citizens or a "Russian -speaking population" imply military support for their evacuation from a zone of an armed conflict or a hwnanitarian disaster. Even fewer statements are also made that it is ad missible to use force
preemptively to meet the demands of unspecified "Russian interests" o r of its alliance commitments.
The d eclared targets of forceful action are individual terrorists, organized
groups of terrorists and their bases. The means to be used in a preemptive strike
against those targets are almost unrestricted, nuclear arms being the only clear exception. According to the defense minister, such a strike would not amount to fullfledged combat action, but would be delivered " to avert a single terrorist threat."
As to the geography of preemptive action, it is realistic to look at areas adjacent
to Russian territory. An utterance by the chief of the General Staff that those strikes
could be delivered "anywhere on the globe"19 appeared inconsistent with the statements of the commander-in-chief ad dressing " interdiction of organized terrorist
groups attem pting to penetrate our territory" and " p ursuing and engaging terrorists."20
Official declarations always underscored that Russian forces will target terrorists and their infrastructure, rather than persons and institutions of a sovereign
State on whose territory the former fo und refuge. Whether done consciously or
not, this seems to be an attempt to stave off prospective charges of committing an
act of aggression. It is worth noting that political and military leaders never miss a
chance to underscore that armed force would be used in str ict compliance with the
constitution, statutes and international law.
So far those declarations have not comprised a comprehensive official doctrine
explaining under what circumstances and according to what criteria Russia would
be inclined to use a military tool to meet a ripening threat. The constitution, however, addresses "an imminent threat of aggression"21 against the Russian Federation
(Article 87.2), in which case the president shall introd uce martial law by a decree. A
decree on the introduction of martial law and a decree on the introduction of the
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state of emergency are the only acts by the president that require approval by the
Council of Federation; all other decrees remain his unilateral prerogative.
The federal constitutional law "On Martial Law" describes the imminent threat
of aggression as "activities by a foreign State (States) committed in violation of the
UN Charter and generally recognized principles and norms of international law
that immediately indicate that an act of aggression against the Russian Federation
is being prepared, including the declaration of war against the Russian Federation"
(Article 3.3).22 The legal gap is further filled by a recent federal law "On Counteracting Terrorism" of 2006,23 as amended, which supersedes an earlier federal law
"On Combating Terrorism" of 1998,24 as amended.
The new law explicitly provides for the use of armed force against targets outside
Russian territory, on the high seas and, presumably, in international airspace. In
this context, it does not speak about preemption; however, the broad range of tasks
indicates that military power might be required to deal with threats that are not
necessarily imminent.
Terrorism is defined in very broad terms as "an ideology of violence and practical impact on the decision making by bodies of State power, bodies of local selfgovernment and international organizations, by way of intimidation of population
and/or by other illegal violent actions" (Article 3(1 )). The law is more specific
when it further defines "terrorist activity" as comprising such diverse elements as
planning, preparation, funding and perpetration of a terrorist act; incitement to
commit a terrorist act; organizing a terrorist group; recruiting, arming and training of terrorists; complicity in planning and committing a terrorist act; and propagandizing of terrorist ideology and calls to engage in it. Finally, a terrorist act is
defined as "explosion, arson or other acts intimidating population and putting
human life at risk of death, leading to substantial loss of property, or to other grave
consequences, with an intent to exert impact on the decision making by bodies of
State power or international organizations, as well as a threat to commit those acts
with same purposes" (Article 2(3), as amended}.25 It is against those acts, or perpetrators thereof, or means employed to commit them that the armed forces shall be
used under the new law.
The law is conspicuously vague as to the outer limits of the airspace where the
military may be ordered to engage a terrorist threat. It does not speak about international airspace. Moreover, it refers to an aircraft "not responding to radio messages from ground controllers to cease violating the rules of navigation in the
airspace of the Russian Federation, or to radio messages and visual signals being
transmitted by the aircraft of the Russian Armed Forces" (Article 7(2»). Unaddressed is the question of whether that provision could come into conflict with
Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention of 1944. 26
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Turning to sea space, the law refers to internal waters and the territorial sea, as
well as to the continental shelf and to "national maritime navigation." Obviously,
the continental shelf may extend as far as 350 nautical miles from the baselines. As
to "national maritime navigation," it is not immediately clear whether the law implies navigation within territorial limits or extends to ships flying the Russian flag
anywhere on the seas, with a possible exception of those chartered by foreign
entities.
There is no need, however, to read between the lines of the law to deduce
grounds for the use of the Russian military against terrorist targets beyond national
borders. Article 10 specifically addresses the issue of trans-boundary deployment
of units, as well as engagement of targets outside Russian territory without crossing
the border. 21 Remarkably, the law never mentions foreign territory as an area of deployment; rather, the phrase that is used in the lead-in paragraph of Article 10. 1 is
"interdiction of international terrorist activity beyond territorial bounds of the
Russian Federation.»
As to internal procedures, the order to fire at terrorists from Russian territory
will be given by the president unilaterally in the exercise of his constitutional powers as the supreme commander-in -chief. To send troops across the border, the
president would first need to obtain consent from the Council of Federation.28
While the original version of the law required that the president submit information regarding the proposed strength of the unit, the areas of deployment and its
duration, that provision was deleted by the Federal Law of July 27, 2006. 29
The law addresses "the interdiction of terrorist activity," which implies preemption due to the broad range of elements of "terrorist activity" as they are defined by
the law. The law makes a general reference to international treaties as sources of authority, along with Russian legislation, for trans-boundary employment of the
armed forces; however, soon after the adoption of the federal law "On Counteracting Terrorism," Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that the law by itselfprovides sufficient grounds for unilateral and preemptive use of force against terrorist
targets on foreign soil..30
This author is not qualified to appraise the true capacity of the Russian military
to engage terrorists who threaten Russian citizens and assets abroad. Unfortunately, however, the recent drama with Russian embassy personnel in Baghdad
sadly proved that neither Russia nor local authorities, not even the occupying powers, were able to control the hostage crisis or save lives of internationally protected
persons}l
The law "On Counteracting Terrorism" lists several principles, some of which
would sound similar to ones found in the established international law. For example, consider the principle of "proportionality of measures undertaken to counter
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terrorism to the level of terrorist threat" (Article 2 (2)) . One can immediately trace
the origins of that principle back to the 1837 Caroline incident, in which the Carolinc, a vessel used to supply Canadian rebels fighting British rule, was captured, set
ablaze and sent over Niagara Falls. One US citizen perished.
Several Soviet, and now Russian, students of international law have at least acknowledged the Caroline doctrine, and some have given it a careful examination.32
While it has not been widely accepted in Russia, some of the official statements regarding the preemptive use of force could be construed as falling within the purview of the Caroline doctrine, which, if properly adapted, could add a degree of
legitimacy to current approaches.
Traditionally, the most often quoted source for the Caroline doctrine has been a
paragraph in the diplomatic note from Daniel Webster, the US secretary of state, to
Henry Fox, the British minister in Washington, DC, dispatched on April 24, 1841.
It is from this note that current international law derives the principles of necessity
and proportionality.3) But we might discover no less substantive statements on
questions oflaw in other parts of Webster's letter, as well as in a later note from
Lord Ashburton, the British minister plenipotentiary on special mission, to SecretaryWebster, and in the address of President Tyler to the US Congress in the aftermath of the Caroline case.:l4
If the Russian government were to contemplate putting into effect provisions of
the federal law "On Counteracting Terrorism" that regulate deployment of Russ ian
armed forces outside Russian territory, it might consider several decision-making
guidelines on the preemptive use of force-first and foremost , necessity and proportionality. Recourse might be had to Lord Ashburton's allusion to circumstances
under which the principle of "inviolable character of the territory of independent
nations"35 could be suspended. According to the British minister, "it must be so for
the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity."36 That limitation could be developed further to include severe restrictions on
the choice of target, which should only be the immediate source of the threat, and
that that source ought to be in the space adjacent to the State's own territory. The
decision should also include consideration of the scale of the threat and the expected gravity of the consequences of inaction.
A decisive argument in favor of a preemptive use of force would be the explicit
consent to or request of a State on whose territory the source of the threat is located
because that State is not capable of coping with it. It might be worthwhile to consider an attack if a neighboring State, on whose soil or under whose flag on the high
seas or in international airspace the threat is maturing, is expressly unwilling to
control it.
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A unilateral resort to force might have to be considered if the imminence of
threat does not leave time to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council
or to a regional arrangement, or jfthere is a continual record of passivity of those
institutions in similar situations, but in any case the Security Council will have to
be notified to comply with requirements of Article 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council. ... ") of the UN Charter. That means that the existence of a threat,
its gravity and imminence will have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
that, in t urn, would necessitate the disclosure of sources and means of collection of
information, bearing in mind that what one party would deem to be waterproof
evidence justifying a preemptive strike, could be strongly rejected by another party.
Resort to armed force would also be proof that other means, including diplomatic
and law-enforcement, turned out to be ineffective, or may have been used
unskillfully.
A State using armed force to divert a seemingly imminent attack shall be expected to bear full responsibility for injuries and damages inflicted upon innocent
persons and their property. A precursor for those injuries might well be inaccurate
informatio n about the exact location of a source of terrorist threat and its preparedness for an attack.
Finally, the location and duration of preemptive action must be clearly defined
to the personnel involved in it, who should be given precise orders and rules of engagement. No action may commence without reliable and executable plans of
evacuation.
Those guidelines are general and some are self-evident. They would need to be
made specific for a particular contingency.
Russia is not the only State that declared its intention to use, as an extreme
means, armed force to eliminate an imminent threat of a massive terrorist attack
and, should dire need arise, project its force beyond its borders. Of course, those
making such statements should make sure that resolute declarations are supported
by adequate resources and the strong will to use them. Otherwise those declarations are likely to be counterproductive and self-harming.
There is a question that could bother a zealous legalist: as more nations, some
of them bearing enormous might, submit that they would use armed force in selfdefense not only to react to an actual attack, but also to preempt an imminent assault, or even prevent it from materializing in the future, would it not give impetus
to claims that a customary rule of international law has already been conceived?31
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25. In the absence of a universally recognized conventional defini tion of terrorism. the UN
Security Council suggested a legal ersatz definition according to which terrorism may be described as
criminal acts. including against civilians. commilted with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages. with the purpose to provoke a state of terror
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S.c. Res. 1566, 3. U.N. Doc. SlRES/1566 (Oct. 8, 20(4) .
26. The amendmen t, known asArticle 3 Vis, was adopted on May 10, 1984. It was prompted
by the downing nine months earlier by Soviet Air Defense of the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747200 Flight KAL 007. It provides as follows:
a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the livesof
persons on hoard and the safety of aircraft must not beendangered. This provision shall
not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth
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b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty,

is entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft flying
above its territory without authority or if there are reasonable gro unds to conclude that
it is being used for any purpose inconsistent wi th the aims of this Conven tion; it may
also give such aircraft any other instructions to put an end to such violations. For this
purpose, the contracting States may resort to any appropriate means consistent with
relevant rules of international law, including th e relevan t provisions of this
Convention, specifically paragraph a) of this Article. Each contracting State agrees to
p ublish its regulations in force regarding the in terception of civil aircraft.
c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity with paragraph
b) of this Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish all necessary
provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such compliance mandatory for
any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who has his
principal place of business or permanent residence in th at State. Each contracting State
shall make any violation of such applicable laws or regulations punishable by .severe
penal ties and shall submit the case to its competent authorities in accordance with its
laws or regulations.
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